Kitap 7
13
But inasmuch as the last premise, which originates action, is an opinion as to some object of sense, and it is this opinion which the unrestrained man when under the influence of passion either does not possess, or only possesses in a way which as we saw does not amount to knowing it but only makes him repeat it as the drunken man repeats the maxims of Empedocles, and since the ultimate term is not a universal, and is not deemed to be an object of Scientific Knowledge in the same way as a universal term is, we do seem to be led to the conclusionCf. 2.1. which Socrates sought to establish.
14
For the knowledge which is present when failure of self-restraintHere τὸ πάθος means ἀκρατεύεσθαι, cf. 2.2, 3.12, 4.6; but in the following line (cf. 2.1) it probably means ἐπιθυμία or θυμός, as 3.7, 5.5, 7.8. occurs is not what is held to be Knowledge in the true sense, nor is it true Knowledge which is dragged about by passion, but knowledge derived from sense-perception.
14
So much for the question whether failure of self-restraint can go with knowledge or not, and with knowledge in what sense.
1
(ii) We must next discuss whether any man can be called unrestrained without qualification, or whether it must always be in relation to certain particular things, and if so, to what sort of things. Now it is plain that men are self-restrained and enduring, unrestrained and soft, in regard to Pleasures and Pains.
