Kitap 7
7
With these unnatural propensities it is possible in some cases merely to have the disposition and not to yield to it: I mean, for instance, PhalarisNo such stories about Phalaris are alluded to elsewhere; so Burnet here brackets the name, supposing the subject of κατεῖχεν to be unexpressed, and taking 5.2 to refer to Phalaris’s well-known practice of burning human victims in a bronze bull. But that was hardly an instance of Bestiality. might have had the desire to eat a child, or to practise unnatural vice, and refrained; or it is possible not merely to possess but to yield to the propensity.
8
As therefore with Vice, that natural to man is called simply vice, whereas the other kindi.e., inhuman vice. is termed not simply vice, but vice with the qualifying epithet bestial or morbid, similarly with Unrestraint, it is clear that the bestial and morbid kinds are distinct from unrestraint proper, and that the name without qualification belongs only to that kind of unrestraint which is co-extensive with Profligacy of the human sort.
9
It is clear then that Self-restraint and Unrestraint relate only to the objects to which Temperance and Profligacy are related, and that unrestraint in relation to anything else is of another kind, which is only so called metaphorically and with a qualification.
1
Let us now consider the point that Unrestraint in anger Lack of control of the spirit : see 4.2, third note is less disgraceful than Unrestraint in the desires.
