Kitap 9
6
The good man’s activity therefore, which is pleasant in itself, will be more continuous if practised with friendsThe last four words are implied by the context.; and the life of the supremely happy should be continuously pleasantThis parenthesis comes better in 9.5 above, after the words, the activity of a good man . . . is good and pleasant in itself. (for a good man, in virtue of his goodness, enjoys actions that conform with virtue and dislikes those that spring from wickedness, just as a skilled musician is pleased by good music and pained by bad).
7
Moreover the society of the good may supply a sort of training in goodness, as TheognisTheognis 35 ἐσθλῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄπ’ ἐσθλὰ μαθήσεαι. remarks.
7
Again, if we examine the matter more fundamentally, it appears that a virtuous friend is essentially desirable for a virtuous man. For as has been said above, that which is essentially good is good and pleasing in itself to the virtuous man. And life is defined, in the case of animals, by the capacity for sensation; in the case of man, by the capacity for sensation and thought. But a capacity is referred to its activity, and in this its full reality consists. It appears therefore that life in the full sense is sensation or thought.But life is a thing good and pleasant in itself, for it is definite, and definiteness is a part of the essence of goodness, and what is essentially good is good for the good man, and hence appears to be pleasant to all men.
8
We must not argue from a vicious and corrupt life, or one that is painful, for such a life is indefinite, like its attributes.i.e., vice and pain. (The point as to pain will be clearer in the sequel.Bk. 10.1-5.)
