Kitap 9
10
and if the virtuous man feels towards his friend in the same way as he feels towards himself (for his friend is a second self) —then, just as a man’s own existence is desirable for him, so, or nearly so, is his friend’s existence also desirable. But, as we saw, it is the consciousness of oneself as goodPerhaps to be emended of its goodness, cf. l. 5 of the Greek. It is consciousness of life as good that makes it pleasant and desirable. that makes existence desirable, and such consciousness is pleasant in itself. Therefore a man ought also to share his friend’s consciousness of his existence, and this is attained by their living together and by conversing and communicating their thoughts to each other; for this is the meaning of living together as applied to human beings, it does not mean merely feeding in the same place, as it does when applied to cattle.
10
If then to the supremely happy man existence is desirable in itself, being good and pleasant essentially, and if his friend’s existence is almost equally desirable to him, it follows that a friend is one of the things to be desired. But that which is desirable for him he is bound to have, or else his condition will be incomplete in that particular. Therefore to be happy a man needs virtuous friends.
1
Ought we then to make as many friends as possible? or, just as it seems a wise saying about hospitality— Neither with troops of guests nor yet with none Hes. WD 715 — so also with friendship perhaps it will be fitting neither to be without friends nor yet to make friends in excessive numbers.
