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For according to the arguments from the sciencesScientific knowledge must have a permanent object (cf. Aristot. Met. 1.4.2. there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciencesIncluding artificial products; cf. Aristot. Met. 1.15.; and according to the One-over-Many argument,The fact that several particulars can have a common quality or nature implies a single Idea of which they all partake (Plat. Rep. 596a). of negations too; and according to the argument that we have some conception of what has perished, of perishable things; because we have a mental picture of these things.The theory always admitted Ideas of perishable things, e.g. man. The objection here is that if the memory of dead men establishes the Idea of man, the memory of a dead individual establishes an Idea of that (perishable) individual. Again, of Plato’s more exact arguments some establish Ideas of relations,Plat. Phaedo 74a-77a, Plat. Rep. 479a-480a. which we do not hold to form a separate genus;
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and others state the Third Man. Several arguments bore this name. Here the reference is probably to the following: If X is a man because he resembles the Idea of Man, there must be a third man in whom the humanity of these two is united. Cf.Plat. Parm. 132a-133a. And in general the arguments for the Forms do away with things which are more important to us exponents of the Forms than the existence of the Ideas; for they imply that it is not the Dyad that is primary, but NumberThe Indeterminate Dyad, being to Aristotle a glorified 2, falls under the Idea of Number, which is therefore prior to it.; and that the relative is prior to the absoluteThis seems to be a development of the same objection. Number, which is relative, becomes prior to the supposedly self-subsistent Dyad.; and all the other conclusions in respect of which certain persons, by following up the views held about the Ideas, have gone against the principles of the theory.
