Kitap 1
12
To say that the Forms are patterns, and that other things participate in them, is to use empty phrases and poetical metaphors; for what is it that fashions things on the model of the IdeasPlato says the Demiurgus?Plat. Tim. 28c, Plat. Tim. 29a. Besides, anything may both be and become like something else without being imitated from it; thus a man may become just like Socrates whether Socrates exists or not,
13
and even if Socrates were eternal, clearly the case would be the same. Also there will be several patterns, and hence Forms, of the same thing; e.g. animal and two-footed will be patterns of man, and so too will the Idea of Man.Why this consequence is objectionable is not quite clear. Perhaps it is on the ground that to account for appearances in this way is not economical.
14
Further, the Forms will be patterns not only of sensible things but of themselves (e.g. genus in the sense of genus of species), and thus the same thing will be both pattern and copy.The species will be the pattern of individuals, and the genus of the species. Further, it would seem impossible that the substance and the thing of which it is the substance exist in separation; hence how can the Ideas, if they are the substances of things, exist in separation from them?Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.10. It is stated in the PhaedoPlat. Phaedo 100d. that the Forms are the causes both of existence and of generation.
15
Yet, assuming that the Forms exist, still the things which participate in them are not generated unless there is something to impart motion; while many other things are generated (e.g. house, ring) of which we hold that there are no Forms. Thus it is clearly possible that all other things may both exist and be generated for the same causes as the things just mentioned.
