Kitap 1
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In general, although Wisdom is concerned with the cause of visible things, we have ignored this question (for we have no account to give of the cause from which change arises),Cf. Aristot. Met. 7.5 and Aristot. Met. 1.9. and in the belief that we are accounting for their substance we assert the existence of other substances; but as to how the latter are the substances of the former, our explanation is worthless—for participation, as we have said before,Aristot. Met. 1.12. means nothing.
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And as for that which we can see to be the cause in the sciences, and through which all mind and all nature works—this causeThe final cause. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.9-10. which we hold to be one of the first principles—the Forms have not the slightest bearing upon it either. Philosophy has become mathematics for modern thinkers,e.g. Speusippus, for whom see Aristot. Met. 7.2.4. although they professCf. Plat. Rep.531c-d that mathematics is only to be studied as a means to some other end.
28
Further, one might regard the substance which they make the material substrate as too mathematical, and as being a predicate and differentia of substance or matter rather than as matter itself, I mean the Great and Small, which is like the Rare and Dense of which the physicists speak,Cf. iv. 10. holding that they are the primary differentiae of the substrate; because these qualities are a species of excess and defect.
