Kitap 10
1
That one has several meanings has been already statedAristot. Met. 5.6. in our distinction of the various meanings of terms. But although it has a number of senses, the things which are primarily and essentially called one, and not in an accidental sense, may be summarized under four heads:
1
(1.) That which is continuous, either absolutely or in particular that which is continuous by natural growth and not by contact or ligature; and of these things those are more strictly and in a prior sense one whose motion is more simple and indivisible.
2
(2.) Of this kind in a still higher degree is that which is a whole and has a definite shape or form, particularly that which is such by nature and not by constraint (like things which are joined by glue or nails or by being tied together), but which contains in itself the cause of its continuity.
3
A thing is of this kind if its motion is one and indivisible in respect of place and time; so that clearly if a thing has as its principle of motion the primary kind of motion (i.e. locomotion) in its primary form (i.e. circular locomotion), it is in the primary sense one spatial magnitude.This description applies to the celestial spheres.
3
Some things, then, are one in this sense, qua continuous or whole; the other things which are one are those whose formula is one.
4
Such are the things of which the concept is one, i.e. of which the concept is indivisible; and this is indivisible when the object is indivisible (3.) in form or (4.) in number. Now in number the individual is indivisible, and in form that which is indivisible in comprehension and knowledge; so that that which causes the unity of substances must be one in the primary sense.
