Kitap 10
9
Therefore those persons are wrong in their criticism who imagine that all terms are used analogously, so that that which is neither a shoe nor a hand will be intermediate between shoe and hand, because that which is neither good nor bad is intermediate between good and bad—as though there must be an intermediate in all cases; but this does not necessarily follow.
10
For the one is a joint negation of opposites where there is an intermediate and a natural interval; but in the other case there is no question of difference, since the joint negation applies to things which are in different genera, and therefore the substrate is not one.Cf. Aristot. Met. 10.3.8
1
A similar question might be raised about one and many. For if many is absolutely opposed to one, certain impossibilities result. (1) One will be few; for many is also opposed to few.
2
(2) Two will be many; since twofold is manifold, and twofold is derived from two. Therefore one will be few; for in what relation can two be many if not in relation to one, which must therefore be few? for there can be nothing less. (3) If much and little are in plurality what long and short are in length, and if whatever is much is also many,
3
and many is much (unless indeed there is a difference in the case of a plastic continuumi.e., a fluid, which cannot be described as many. ), few will be a plurality. Therefore one will be a plurality, if it is few; and this necessarily follows if two is many. Presumably, however, although many in a sense means much, there is a distinction; e.g., water is called much but not many.
