Kitap 10
4
To all things, however, which are divisible the term many is applicable: in one sense, if there is a plurality which involves excess either absolutely or relatively (and similarly few is a plurality involving defect); and in another in the sense of number, in which case it is opposed to one only. For we say one or many just as if we were to say one and ones, or white thing and white things, or were to compare the things measured with the measure.
5
Multiples, too, are spoken of in this way; for every number is many, because it consists of ones, and because every number is measurable by one; and also as being the opposite of one, and not of few. In this sense even two is many; but as a plurality involving excess either relatively or absolutely it is not many, but the first plurality. Two is, however, absolutely few; because it is the first plurality involving defect
6
(hence AnaxagorasCf. Aristot. Met. 1.3.9. was not right in leaving the subject by saying all things were together, infinite both in multitude and in smallness; instead of in smallness he should have said in fewness,sc. and then the absurdity of his view would have been apparent, for, etc. Aristotle assumes the Anaxagoras meant smallness (μικρότης) to be the opposite of multitude (πλῆθος); but he meant just what he said—that the particles of which things consist are infinitely many and infinitely small. See Bowman in Classical Review 30, 42-44. for things cannot be infinite in fewness), since fewness is constituted not by one, as some hold, but by two.
7
In the sphere of numbers one is opposed to many as the measure to the measurable, i.e., as relative terms are opposed which are not of their own nature relative. We have distinguished elsewhereAristot. Met. 5.15.8, 9. that things are called relative in two senses—either as being contraries, or as knowledge is related to the knowable, A being related to B because B is described in relation to A.
