Kitap 10
3
Hence the whiteness or blackness of a man does not produce this, nor is there any specific difference between a white man and a black man; not even if one term is assigned to each. For we are now regarding man as matter, and matter does not produce difference; and for this reason, too, individual men are not species of man, although the flesh and bones of which this and that man consist are different. The concrete whole is other, but not other in species, because there is no contrariety in the formula, and this is the ultimate indivisible species.
4
But Callias is definition and matter. Then so too is white man, because it is the individual, Callias, who is white. Hence man is only white accidentally. Again, a bronze circle and a wooden one do not differ in species; and a bronze triangle and a wooden circle differ in species not because of their matter, but because there is contrariety in their formulae.
5
But does not matter, when it is other in a particular way, make things other in species? Probably there is a sense in which it does. Otherwise why is this particular horse other in species than this particular man, although the definitions involve matter? Surely it is because there is contrariety in the definition, for so there also is in white man and black horse; and it is a contrariety in species, but not because one is white and the other black; for even if they had both been white, they would still be other in species.
6
Male and female are attributes peculiar to the animal, but not in virtue of its substance; they ar material or physical. Hence the same semen may, as the result of some modification, become either female or male.
6
We have now stated what to be other in species means, and why some things differ in species and others do not.
