Kitap 11
8
Thus, although there is no absolute proof of these axioms, there is an ad hominem proof where one’s opponent makes these assumptions.sect. 8=Aristot. Met. 4.3.10. Perhaps even Heraclitus himself, if he had been questioned on these lines, would have been compelled to admit that opposite statements can never be true of the same subjects; as it is, he adopted this theory through ignorance of what his doctrine implied.
9
In general,sect. 9-11=Aristot. Met. 4.4.31. if what he says is true, not even this statement itself (I mean that the same thing can at one and the same time be and not be) will be true;
10
because just as, when they are separated, the affirmation is no more true than the negation, so in the same way, if the complex statement is taken as a single affirmation, the negation will be just as true as the whole statement regarded as an affirmation.
11
And further, if nothing can be truly affirmed, then this very statement—that there is no such thing as a true affirmation—will be false. But if there is such a thing, the contentions of those who raise objections of this kind and utterly destroy rational discourse may be considered to be refuted.Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.8.4, 5.
1
Very similar to the views which we have just mentioned is the dictum of ProtagorasThis chapter forms a summary of Aristot. Met. 4.5-8. sect. 1-3=Aristot. Met. 4.5.1-5.; for he said that man is the measure of all things, by which he meant simply that each individual’s impressions are positively true.
2
But if this is so, it follows that the same thing is and is not, and is bad and good, and that all the other implications of opposite statements are true; because often a given thing seems beautiful to one set of people and ugly to another, and that which seems to each individual is the measure.
