Kitap 11
9
As for what is in the sense of what is true or what is accidental , the former depends upon a combination in thought, and is an affection of thought (hence we do not look for the principles of Being in this sense, but only for those of objective and separable Being) the latter is not necessary but indeterminate (I mean the accidental); and of such a thing the causes are indefinite and cannot be reduced to a system.
10
Teleology is found in events which come about in the course of nature or as a result of thought.This section is taken from Aristot. Physics 2.5, 6. It is chance 〈or luck〉 when one of these comes about by accident; for a thing may be a cause, just as it may exist, either per se or accidentally. Chance is an accidental cause of normally purposive teleological events.
11
Hence chance and thought have the same sphere of action, for there is no purpose without thought. Causes from which chance results may come about are indeterminate; hence chance is inscrutable to human calculation, and is a cause only accidentally, but in the strictest sense is a cause of nothing.
12
It is good or bad luck when the result is good or bad, and good or bad fortune when the result is on a large scale.
12
Since nothing accidental is prior to that which is per se, neither are accidental causes prior. Therefore if chance or spontaneity is the cause of the universe, mind and nature are prior causes.The argument is stated more fully and clearly in Aristot. Physics 2.6ff.. Chance produces indirectly the effects produced directly by mind; and spontaneity is similarly related to nature. But the indirect cause presupposes the direct. The argument is directed against the Atomists. Cf. Aristot. Phys. 196a 24, Simplicius 327.24, Cicero De Nat. Deor. 1.66 (nulla cogente natura, sed concursu quodam fortuito).