Kitap 11
1
A thing may exist only actually or potentially, or actually and potentially; it may be a substance or a quantity or one of the other categories. There is no motionThe discussion of motion in this chapter consists of extracts from Aristot. Physics 3.1-3. apart from things, for change is always in accordance with the categories of Beingi.e., change is substantial (generation and destruction); quantitative (increase and decrease); qualitative (alteration); spatial (locomotion). Cf. Aristot. Met. 11.12.1, 2.; and there is nothing which is common to these and in no one category. Each category belongs to all its members in two ways—e.g. substance, for this is sometimes the form of the thing and sometimes its privation;
2
and as regards quality there is white and black; and as regards quantity, complete and incomplete; and as regards spatial motion there is up and down or light and heavy—so that there are as many forms of motion and change as there are of Being.This is inaccurate; see previous note.
2
Now since every kind of thing is divided into the potential and the real, I call the actualization of the potential as such,What Aristotle means by this is explained more clearly in the following sections, which may be summarized thus. The material substrate, e.g. bricks, etc., which is potentially a house, may be regarded (a) as potential material; in this sense it is actualized as bricks before building begins; (b) as potentially a house; in this sense when it is actualized it is no longer buildable but built, i.e., it is no longer potential; (c) as potentially buildable into a house. In this sense its actualization is conterminous with the process of building, and is incomplete (sect.11), and should not be described as ἐντελέχεια or complete reality. But Aristotle often uses this term as synonymous with the vaguer ἐνέργεια. motion.
