Kitap 11
8
On the other hand, if we posit the principles which seem most unchangeable, Being and Unity,Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.13, Aristot. Met. 3.4.24-34.(a) unless each of them denotes a particular thing and a substance, how can they be separate and independent? but the eternal and primary principles for which we are looking are of this nature.
9
(b) If, however, each of them denotes a particular thing and a substance, then all existing things are substances; for Being is predicated of everything, and Unity also of some things.
10
But that all things are substances is false. (c) As for those who maintain that Unity is the first principle and a substance, and who generate number from Unity and matter as their first product, and assert that it is a substance, how can their theory be true? How are we to conceive of 2 and each of the other numbers thus composed, as one? On this point they give no explanation; nor is it easy to give one.
11
But if we posit lines or the things derived from them (I mean surfaces in the primary sensei.e., intelligible surfaces, etc.) as principles,Cf. Aristot. Met. 3.1.15, Aristot. Met. 3.5. these at least are not separately existing substances, but sections and divisions, the former of surfaces and the latter of bodies (and points are sections and divisions of lines); and further they are limits of these same things. All these things are integral parts of something else, and not one of them exists separately.
12
Further, how are we to suppose that there is a substance of unity or a point? for in the case of every substancesc. which is liable to generation or destruction. there is a process of
12
generation, but in the case of the point there is not; for the point is a division.
