Kitap 12
2
And since that which is moved while it moves is intermediate, there is something which moves without being moved; something eternal which is both substance and actuality.
2
Now it moves in the following manner. The object of desire and the object of thought move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and thought are the same. For it is the apparent good that is the object of appetite, and the real good that is the object of the rational will.This shows that desire in general (of which appetite and will are the irrational and rational aspects) has as its object the good. Desire is the result of opinion rather than opinion that of desire; it is the act of thinking that is the starting-point.
3
Now thought is moved by the intelligible, and one of the series of contrariesAristotle himself recognizes two series, lists or columns of contraries, similar to those of the Pythagoreans (Aristot. Met. 1.5.6). One, the positive, contains being, unity, substance, etc.; the other is negative and contains not-being, plurality, non-substance, etc. The negative terms are intelligible only in reference to the positive. Cf. Aristot. Met. 4.2.21. is essentially intelligible. In this series substance stands first, and of substance that which is simple and exists actually. (The one and the simple are not the same; for one signifies a measure,Cf Aristot. Met. 5.6.17. whereas simple means that the subject itself is in a certain state.)
4
But the Good, and that which is in itself desirable, are also in the same series; and that which is first in a class is always best or analogous to the best.
