Kitap 12
6
But this also is disposed of in the same way; for the one matter of two contraries is contrary to nothing. Further, on their view everything except Unity itself will partake of evil; for the BadThe Bad was identified with the unequal; cf. Aristot. Met. 1.6.10. is itself one of the elements. The other schoolSee Aristot. Met. 12.7.10 does not even regard the Good and the Bad as principles; yet the Good is in the truest sense a principle in all things. The former school is right in holding that the Good is a principle, but they do not explain how it is a principle— whether as an end or as a moving cause or as form.
7
Empedocles theory is also absurd, for he identifies the Good with Love.Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.4.3. This is a principle both as causing motion (since it combines) and as matter (since it is part of the mixture).Empedocles Fr. 17 (Diels), 18-20. Now even if it so happens that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as causing motion, still the essence of the two principles is not the same. In which respect, then, is Love a principle? And it is also absurd that Strife should be imperishable; strife is the very essence of evil.Cf. Aristot. Met. 9.9.3.
