Kitap 13
12
I mean, e.g., that if a thing participates in absolute doubleness, it participates also in something eternal, but only accidentally; because it is an accident of doubleness to be eternal. Thus the Ideas will be substance. But the same terms denote substance in the sensible as in the Ideal world; otherwise what meaning will there be in saying that something exists besides the particulars, i.e. the unity comprising their multiplicity?
13
If the form of the Ideas and of the things which participate in them is the same, they will have something in common (for why should duality mean one and the same thing in the case of perishable 2’s and the 2’s which are many but eternal, and not in the case of absolute duality and a particular 2?). But if the form is not the same, they will simply be homonyms; just as though one were to call both Callias and a piece of wood man, without remarking any property common to them.
14
sect. 14, 15 have no counterpart in Book 1.And if we profess that in all other respects the common definitions apply to the Forms, e.g. that plane figure and the other parts of the definition apply to the Ideal circle, only that we must also state of what the Form is a Form, we must beware lest this is a quite meaningless statement.The suggestion is that the definition of an Ideal circle is the same as that of a particular circle, except that it must have added to it the statement of what particular the Idea is an Idea.
15
For to what element of the definition must the addition be made? to center, or plane or all of them? For all the elements in the essence of an Idea are Ideas; e.g. animal and two-footed. sc. in the definition or essence of Ideal man. Further, it is obvious that being an Idea, just like plane, must be a definite characteristic which belongs as genus to all its species.i.e., being an idea will be a characteristic common to all ideas, and so must be itself an Idea.
