Kitap 14
18
It is absurd, then, or rather impossible, to represent non-substance as an element of substance and prior to it; for all the other categories are posterior to substance. And further, the elements are not predicated of those things of which they are elements; yet many and few are predicated, both separately and together, of number; and long and short are predicated of the line, and the Plane is both broad and narrow.
19
If, then, there is a plurality of which one term, viz. few, is always predicable, e.g. 2 (for if 2 is many, 1 will be fewCf. Aristot. Met. 10.6.1-3.), then there will be an absolute many; e.g., 10 will be many (if there is nothing more than 10Cf. Aristot. Met. 13.8.17.), or 10,000. How, then, in this light, can number be derived from Few and Many? Either both ought to be predicated of it, or neither; but according to this view only one or the other is predicated.
1
But we must inquire in general whether eternal things can be composed of elements. If so, they will have matter; for everything which consists of elements is composite.
2
Assuming, then, that that which consists of anything, whether it has always existed or it came into being, must come into being 〈if at all〉 out of that of which it consists; and that everything comes to be that which it comes to be out of that which is it potentially (for it could not have come to be out of that which was not potentially such, nor could it have consisted of it); and that the potential can either be actualized or not; then however everlasting number or anything else which has matter may be, it would be possible for it not to exist, just as that which is any number of years old is as capable of not existing as that which is one day old. And if this is so, that which has existed for so long a time that there is no limit to it may also not exist.
