Kitap 14
14
As it is, they inquire how it is that there are many units besides the primary unity, but not how there are many unequal things besides the Unequal. Yet they employ in their arguments and speak of Great and Small, Many and Few (of which numbers are composed), Long and Short (of which the line is composed), Broad and Narrow (of which the plane is composed), Deep and Shallow (of which solids are composed); and they mention still further kinds of relation.Cf. Aristot. Met. 14.1.6, 18, Aristot. Met. 1.9.23. Now what is the cause of plurality in these relations?
15
We must, then, as I say, presuppose in the case of each thing that which is it potentially. The authorPlato. of this theory further explained what it is that is potentially a particular thing or substance, but is not per se existent—that it is the relative (he might as well have said quality); which is neither potentially unity or Being, nor a negation of unity or Being, but just a particular kind of Being.
16
And it was still more necessary, as we have said,sect. 11. that, if he was inquiring how it is that things are many, he should not confine his inquiry to things in the same category, and ask how it is that substances or qualities are many, but that he should ask how it is that things in general are many; for some things are substances, some affections, and some relations.
17
Now in the case of the other categories there is an additional difficulty in discovering how they are many. For it may be said that since they are not separable, it is because the substrate becomes or is many that qualities and quantities are many; yet there must be some matter for each class of entities, only it cannot be separable from substances.
