Kitap 2
11
for the prior definition is always closer, and the posterior is not; and where the original definition does not apply, neither does the subsequent one. Further, those who hold such a view do away with scientific knowledge, for on this view it is impossible to know anything until one comes to terms which cannot be analyzed.
12
Understanding, too, is impossible; for how can one conceive of things which are infinite in this way? It is different in the case of the line, which, although in respect of divisibility it never stops, yet cannot be conceived of unless we make a stop (which is why, in examining an infinitei.e. infinitely divisible. line, one cannot count the sections).It does not follow that we can apprehend that which is infinite because we can apprehend a line which is infinitely divisible. We can only really apprehend the line by setting a limit to its divisibility and regarding it simply as divisible into a very great (but not infinite) number of sections. An infinite number of sections can neither be apprehended nor counted.
13
Even matter has to be conceived under the form of something which changes,Matter too, which is infinite in its varieties, can only be apprehended in the form of concrete sensible objects which are liable to change. This seems to be the meaning of the text, but Ross’s reading and interpretation may be right: see his note ad loc. and there can be nothing which is infinite.i.e. not actually, but only potentially. In any case the concept of infinity is not infinite.Cf. the third note above.
13
Again, if the kinds of causes were infinite in number it would still be impossible to acquire knowledge; for it is only when we have become acquainted with the causes that we assume that we know a thing; and we cannot, in a finite time, go completely through what is additively infinite.
