Kitap 3
8
(8.) Further, the following difficulty might be raised about the first principles. If they are one in kind, none of them will be one in number, not even the Idea of Unity or of Being. And how can there be knowledge unless there is some universal term?If the principles are one in kind only, particular things cannot be referred to the same principle but only to like principles; i.e., there will be no universal terms, without which there can be no knowledge.
9
On the other hand if they are numerically one, and each of the principles is one, and not, as in the case of sensible things, different in different instances (e.g. since a given syllable is always the same in kind, its first principles are always the same in kind, but only in kind, since they are essentially different in number)—if the first principles are one, not in this sense, but numerically, there will be nothing else apart from the elements; for numerically one and individual are identical in meaning. This is what we mean by individual: the numerically one; but by universal we mean what is predicable of individuals.
10
Hence just as, if the elements of languageOr letters of the alphabet. Cf. Aristot. Met. 1.9.36n. were limited in number, the whole of literature would be no more than those elements—that is, if there were not two nor more than two of the same 〈so it would be in the case of existing things and their principles〉.For the answer to the problem see Aristot. Met. 12.4-5, Aristot. Met. 13.10.
11
(ix.) There is a difficulty, as serious as any, which has been left out of account both by present thinkers and by their predecessors: whether the first principles of perishable and imperishable things are the same or different. For if they are the same, how is it that some things are perishable and others imperishable, and for what cause?
