Kitap 3
27
Those who posit more numerous elements also hold the same view; for they too must identify Unity and Being with all the principles which they recognize. And it follows that unless one assumes Unity and Being to be substance in some sense, no other universal term can be substance; for Unity and Being are the most universal of all terms,
28
and if there is no absolute Unity or absolute Being, no other concept can well exist apart from the so-called particulars. Further, if Unity is not substance, clearly number cannot be a separate characteristic of things; for number is units, and the unit is simply a particular kind of one.
29
On the other hand, if there is absolute Unity and Being, their substance must be Unity and Being; for no other term is predicated universally of Unity and Being, but only these terms themselves. Again, if there is to be absolute Being and absolute Unity, it is very hard to see how there can be anything else besides these; I mean, how things can be more than one.
30
For that which is other than what is, is not; and so by Parmenides’ argumentBy τὸ ὄν Parmenides meant what is, i.e. the real universe, which he proved to be one thing because anything else must be what is not, or non-existent. The Platonists meant by it being in the abstract. Aristotle ignores this distinction. it must follow that all things are one, i.e. Being. In either case there is a difficulty; for whether Unity is not a substance or whether there is absolute Unity, number cannot be a substance.
31
It has already been stated why this is so if Unity is not a substance; and if it is, there is the same difficulty as about Being. For whence, if not from the absolute One or Unity, can there be another one? It must be not-one; but all things are either one, or many of which each is one. Further, if absolute Unity is indivisible, by Zeno’s axiom it will be nothing.
