Kitap 3
14
and (xi.) whether the first principles are universal or like individual thingsDiscussed Aristot. Met. 3.6.7-9; for the answer see Aristot. Met. 7.13-15, Aristot. Met. 13.10.; and (12.) whether they exist potentially or actually; and further whether their potentiality or actuality depends upon anything other than motionDiscussed Aristot. Met. 3.6.5-6; for the relation of potentiality to actuality see Aristot. Met. 9.1-9; for actuality and motion see Aristot. Met. 12.6-7.; for these questions may involve considerable difficulty.
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Moreover we must ask (13.) whether numbers and lines and figures and points are substances in any sense, or not; and if they are, whether they are separate from sensible things or inherent in them.Discussed Aristot. Met. 3.5; answered Aristot. Met. 13.1-3, 6-9; Aristot. Met. 14.1-3, 5, 6. With regard to these problems not only is it difficult to attain to the truth, but it is not even easy to state all the difficulties adequately.For another statement of the problems sketched in this chapter see Aristot. Met. 9.1, 2.
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(1.) Firstly, then, with respect to the first point raised: whether it is the province of one science or of more than one to study all the kinds of causes. How can one science comprehend the first principles unless they are contraries? Again, in many things they are not all present.
2
How can a principle of motion be in immovable things? or the nature of the Good? for everything which is good in itself and of its own nature is an end and thus a cause, because for its sake other things come to be and exist; and the end and purpose is the end of some action, and all actions involve motion; thus it would be impossible either for this principle to exist in motionless things or for there to be any absolute Good.
3
Hence in mathematics too nothing is proved by means of this cause, nor is there any demonstration of the kind because it is better or worse; indeed no one takes any such consideration into account.
