Kitap 3
19
If of the same, then the science of substance too would be in some sense demonstrative; but it does not seem that there is any demonstration of the what is it? And if of a different science, what will be the science which studies the attributes of substance? This is a very difficult question to answer.This problem, together with the appendix to it stated in Aristot. Met. 3.1.9-10, is answered in Aristot. Met. 4.2.8-25.
20
(iv.) Further, are we to say that only sensible substances exist, or that others do as well? and is there really only one kind of substance, or more than one (as they hold who speak of the Forms and the Intermediates, which they maintain to be the objects of the mathematical sciences)?
21
In what sense we Platonists hold the Forms to be both causes and independent substances has been statedAristot. Met. 1.6. in our original discussion on this subject. But while they involve difficulty in many respects, not the least absurdity is the doctrine that there are certain entities apart from those in the sensible universe, and that these are the same as sensible things except in that the former are eternal and the latter perishable.As it stands this is a gross misrepresentation; but Aristotle’s objection is probably directed against the conception of Ideas existing independently of their particulars. See Introduction.
22
For Platonists say nothing more or less than that there is an absolute Man, and Horse, and Health; in which they closely resemble those who state that there are Gods, but of human form; for as the latter invented nothing more or less than eternal men, so the former simply make the Forms eternal sensibles.
22
Again, if anyone posits Intermediates distinct from Forms and sensible things, he will have many difficulties;
