Kitap 4
7
Thus in the first place it is obvious that this at any rate is true: that the term to be or not to be has a definite meaning; so that not everything can be so and not so. Again, if man has one meaning, let this be two-footed animal.
8
By has one meaning I mean this: if X means man, then if anything is a man, its humanity will consist in being X. And it makes no difference even if it be said that man has several meanings, provided that they are limited in number; for one could assign a different name to each formula.
9
For instance, it might be said that man has not one meaning but several, one of which has the formula two-footed animal, and there might be many other formulae as well, if they were limited in number; for a particular name could be assigned to each for formula.
10
If on the other hand it be said that man has an infinite number of meanings, obviously there can be no discourse; for not to have one meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning there is an end of discourse with others, and even, strictly speaking, with oneself; because it is impossible to think of anything if we do not think of one thing; and even if this were possible, one name might be assigned to that of which we think.
11
Now let this name, as we said at the beginning, have a meaning; and let it have one meaning. Now it is impossible that being man should have the same meaning as not being man, that is, if man is not merely predicable of one subject but has one meaning
12
(for we do not identify having one meaning with being predicable of one subject, since in this case cultured and white and man would have one meaning, and so all things would be one; for they would all have the same meaning). And it will be impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, except by equivocation, as e.g. one whom we call man others might call not-man;
