Kitap 4
28
And the result is the dictum of Anaxagoras, all things mixed together Fr. 1 (Diels). ; so that nothing truly exists. It seems, then, that they are speaking of the Indeterminate; and while they think that they are speaking of what exists, they are really speaking of what does not; for the Indeterminate is that which exists potentially but not actually.
29
But indeed they must admit the affirmation or negation of any predicate of any subject, for it is absurd that in the case of each term its own negation should be true, and the negation of some other term which is not true of it should not be true. I mean, e.g., that if it is true to say that a man is not a man, it is obviously also true to say that he is or is not a trireme.
30
Then if the affirmation is true, so must the negation be true; but if the affirmation is not true the negation will be even truer than the negation of the original term itself. Therefore if the latter negation is true, the negation of trireme will also be true; and if this is true, the affirmation will be true too.
30
And not only does this follow for those who hold this theory, but also that it is not necessary either to affirm or to deny a statement.
31
For if it is true that X is both man and not-man, clearly he will be neither man nor not-man; for to the two statements there correspond two negations, and if the former is taken as a single statement compounded out of two, the latter is also a single statement and opposite to it.
32
Again, either this applies to all terms, and the same thing is both white and not-white, and existent and non-existent, and similarly with all other assertions and negations; or it does not apply to all, but only to some and not to others.
