Kitap 4
36
For if it is equally possible to assert or deny anything of anything, one thing will not differ from another; for if anything does differ, it will be true and unique. And similarly even if it is possible to make a true statement while separating the predicates, what we have stated follows. Moreover it follows that all statements would be true and all false; and that our opponent himself admits that what he says is false. Besides, it is obvious that discussion with him is pointless, because he makes no real statement.
37
For he says neither yes nor no, but yes and no; and again he denies both of these and says neither yes nor no; otherwise there would be already some definite statement.
37
Again, if when the assertion is true the negation is false, and when the latter is true the affirmation is false, it will be impossible to assert and deny with truth the same thing at the same time.
38
But perhaps it will be said that this is the point at issue.
38
Again, is the man wrong who supposes that a thing is so or not so, and he who supposes both right? If he is right, what is the meaning of saying that such is the nature of reality?If everything is both so and not so, nothing has any definite nature. And if he is not right, but is more right than the holder of the first view, reality will at once have a definite nature, and this will be true, and not at the same time not-true.
39
And if all men are equally right and wrong, an exponent of this view can neither speak nor mean anything, since at the same time he says both yes and no. And if he forms no judgement, but thinks and thinks not indifferently, what difference will there be between him and the vegetables?
39
Hence it is quite evident that no one, either of those who profess this theory or of any other school, is really in this position.
