Kitap 4
4
And so, just as there is one science of all healthy things, so it is true of everything else. For it is not only in the case of terms which express one common notion that the investigation belongs to one science, but also in the case of terms which relate to one particular characteristic; for the latter too, in a sense, express one common notion. Clearly then the study of things which are, qua being, also belongs to one science.
5
Now in every case knowledge is principally concerned with that which is primary, i.e. that upon which all other things depend, and from which they get their names. If, then, substance is this primary thing, it is of substances that the philosopher must grasp the first principles and causes.
5
Now of every single class of things, as there is one perception, so there is one science: e.g., grammar, which is one science, studies all articulate sounds.
6
Hence the study of all the species of Being qua Being belongs to a science which is generically one, and the study of the several species of Being belongs to the specific parts of that science.
6
Now if Being and Unity are the same, i.e. a single nature, in the sense that they are associated as principle and cause are, and not as being denoted by the same definition (although it makes no difference but rather helps our argument if we understand them in the same sense),
7
since one man and man and existent man and man are the same thing, i.e. the duplication in the statement he is a man and an existent man gives no fresh meaning (clearly the concepts of humanity and existence are not dissociated in respect of either coming to be or ceasing to be), and similarly in the case of the term one, so that obviously the additional term in these phrases has the same significance, and Unity is nothing distinct from Being;
