Kitap 5
2
(c) If a thing has not an attribute which it would naturally possess, and when it would naturally possess it (for blindness is a form of privation; but a man is not blind at any age, but only if he lacks sight at the age when he would naturally possess itThe qualification refers, I suppose, to the fact that an embryo does not naturally possess sight.), and similarly if itThe subject seems to be indefinite, but no doubt Aristotle is thinking primarily of the particular example which he has just given. A man is not called blind if he does not see in the dark, or if he does not see with his ears, or if he does not see sound, or if he does not see what is behind him or too far away ( Ross). lacks an attribute in the medium and organ and relation and manner in which it would naturally possess it.
3
(d) The forcible removal of anything is called privation. (e) Privation has as many senses as there are senses of negation derived from the negative affix (ἀ-). For we call a thing unequal because it does not possess equality (though it would naturally do so); and invisible either because it has no color at all or because it has only a faint one; and footless either because it has no feet at all or because it has rudimentary feet.
4
Again, a negative affix may mean having something in a small degree—e.g. stoneless— that is, having it in some rudimentary manner. Again, it may mean having it not easily or not well; e.g., uncutable means not only that which cannot be cut, but that which cannot be cut easily or well. And again, it may mean not having a thing at all; for it is not the one-eyed man, but the man who lacks sight in both eyes, who is called blind. Hence not every man is good or bad, moral or immoral; there is also the intermediate state.
