Kitap 5
4
It is from this sense of necessary that all others are somehow derived; for the term compulsory is used of something which it is necessary for one to do or suffer only when it is impossible to act according to impulse, because of the compulsion: which shows that necessity is that because of which a thing cannot be otherwise; and the same is true of the concomitant conditions of living and of the good. For when in the one case good, and in the other life or existence, is impossible without certain conditions, these conditions are necessary, and the cause is a kind of necessity.
5
(e) Again, demonstration is a necessary thing, because a thing cannot be otherwise if the demonstration has been absolute. And this is the result of the first premisses, when it is impossible for the assumptions upon which the syllogism depends to be otherwise.
5
Thus of necessary things, some have an external cause of their necessity, and others have not, but it is through them that other things are of necessity what they are.
6
Hence the necessary in the primary and proper sense is the simple , for it cannot be in more than one condition. Hence it cannot be in one state and in another; for if so it would ipso facto be in more than one condition. Therefore if there are certain things which are eternal and immutable, there is nothing in them which is compulsory or which violates their nature.
1
The term one is used (1.) in an accidental, (2.) in an absolute sense. (1.) In the accidental sense it is used as in the case of CoriscusCoriscus of Scepsis was a Platonist with whom Aristotle was probably acquainted; but the name is of course chosen quite arbitrarily. and cultured and cultured Coriscus (for Coriscus and cultured and cultured Coriscus mean the same);
2
and cultured and upright and cultured upright Coriscus. For all these terms refer accidentally to one thing; upright and cultured because they are accidental to one substance, and cultured and Coriscus because the one is accidental to the other.
