Kitap 7
3
But perhaps it is not necessarily true that the essence of accidental combinations is the same as that of the simple terms; because the extremes of the syllogism are not identical with the middle term in the same way.The argument consists of two syllogisms: White=essence of white man. Man=white man. Therefore man=essence of white man. But essence of man=man. Therefore essence of man=essence of white man. The conclusion is faulty because whereas the first identity is assumed to be absolute, the second is accidental. Perhaps it might be thought to follow that the accidental extremes are identical; e.g. essence of white and essence of cultured; but this is not admitted.Aristotle seems to mean that both essence of white man and essence of cultured man might be proved by the former syllogism to be identical in the same way with the middle term man, in which case it would seem that essence of white and essence of cultured are the same. There is, however, the same fallacy as before.
4
But in per se expressions, is the thing necessarily the same as its essence, e.g., if there are substances which have no other substances or entities prior to them, such as some hold the Ideas to be?
5
For if the Ideal Good is to be different from the essence of good, and the Ideal Animal and Being from the essence of animal and being, there will be other substances and entities and Ideas besides the ones which they describe; and prior to them, if essence is substance. And if they are separate from each other, there will be no knowledge of the Ideas, and the essences will not exist
6
(by being separate I mean if neither the essence of good is present in the Ideal Good, nor being good in the essence of good); for it is when we know the essence of it that we have knowledge of a thing. And it is the same with other essences as with the essence of good; so that if the essence of good is not good, neither will the essence of being be, nor the essence of one be one.
