Kitap 7
7
Either all essences exist alike, or none of them; and so if not even the essence of being is, neither will any other essence exist. Again that to which essentially good does not apply cannot be good. Hence the good must be one with the essence of good, the beautiful with the essence of beauty, and so with all terms which are not dependent upon something else, but self-subsistent and primary.The example of the Ideas as per se terms is used by Aristotle to show incidentally the fallacy of the Ideal theory: there can be no self-subsistent entity apart from the essence.
8
For it is enough if this is so, even if they are not Forms; or perhaps rather even if they are. (At the same time it is clear also that if the Ideas are such as some hold, the substrate will not be substance; for the Ideas must be substances, but not involving a substrate, because if they did involve one they would exist in virtue of its participation in them.)This criticism is irrelevant to the point under discussion. It simply points out that the Ideal theory conflicts with received opinion (cf. Aristot. Met. 7.3.1).
9
That each individual thing is one and the same with its essence, and not merely accidentally so, is apparent, not only from the foregoing considerations, but because to have knowledge of the individual is to have knowledge of its essence; so that by setting out examples it is evident that both must be identical.
10
But as for the accidental term, e.g. cultured or white, since it has two meanings, it is not true to say that the term itself is the same as its essence; for both the accidental term and that of which it is an accident are white, so that in one sense the essence and the term itself are the same, and in another they are not, because the essence is not the same as the man or the white man, but it is the same as the affection.
