Kitap 7
6
and it is primary also in definition, because in the formula of each thing the formula of substance must be inherent; and we assume that we know each particular thing most truly when we know what man or fire is— rather than its quality or quantity or position; because we know each of these points too when we know what the quantity or quality is.
7
Indeed, the question which was raised long ago, is still and always will be, and which always baffles us—What is Being?—is in other words What is substance? Some say that it is oneThe Milesians and Eleatics.; others, more than one; some, finiteThe Pythagoreans and Empedocles.; others, infinite.Anaxagoras and the Atomists. And so for us too our chief and primary and practically our only concern is to investigate the nature of being in the sense of substance.
1
Substance is thought to be present most obviously in bodies. Hence we call animals and plants and their parts substances, and also natural bodies, such as fire, water, earth, etc., and all things which are parts of these or composed of these, either of parts or them or of their totality; e.g. the visible universe and its parts, the stars and moon and sun.
2
We must consider whether (a) these are the only substances, or (b) these and some others, or (c) some of these, or (d) some of these and some others, or (e) none of these, but certain others. SomeThe Pythagoreans. hold that the bounds of body—i.e. the surface, line, point and unit—are substances, and in a truer sense than body or the solid.
3
Again, someThe pre-Socratics. believe that there is nothing of this kind besides sensible things, while others believe in eternal entities more numerous and more real than sensible things. Thus Plato posited the Forms and the objects of mathematics as two kinds of substance, and as a third the substance of sensible bodies;
