Kitap 7
3
It is clear also from what we have said that in a sense all artificial things are generated either from something which bears the same name (as is the case with natural objects) or from a part of themselves which bears the same name as themselves (e.g. a house from a house, inasmuch as it is generated by mind; for the art is the form), or from something which contains some part; that is if the generation is not accidental; for the direct and independent cause of the production is a part of the product.
4
Heat in the motion produces heat in the body; and either this is health or a part of health, or a part of health or health accompanies it. And this is why heat is said to produce health, because it produces that of which health is a concomitant and consequence. Therefore as essence is the starting-point of everything in syllogisms (because syllogisms start from the what of a thing), so too generation proceeds from it.
5
And it is the same with natural formations as it is with the products of art. For the seed produces just as do those things which function by art. It contains the form potentially, and that from which the seed comes has in some sense the same name as the product (for we must not expect that all should have the same name in the sense that man is produced by man—since woman is also produced by man); unless the product is a freak. This is why a mule is not produced by a mule.
6
Those natural objects which are produced, like artificial objects, spontaneously, are those whose matter can also initiate for itself that motion which the seed initiates. Those whose matter cannot do this cannot be generated otherwise than by their proper parents.
6
It is not only with reference to substance that our argument shows that the form is not generated; the same argument is common in its application to all the primary divisions, i.e. quantity, quality and the other categories.
