Kitap 7
7
For just as the bronze sphere is generated, but not the sphere nor the bronze; and as in the case of bronze, if it is generated the form and matter are not (because they must always pre-exist), so it is too with the what and the quality and quantity and the other categories similarly; for it is not the quality that is generated, but the wood of that quality; nor is it the size, but the wood or animal of that size.
8
But a peculiarity of substance may be gathered from this: that some other substance must pre-exist in actuality which produces it; e.g. an animal, if an animal is being generated; but a quality or quantity need not pre-exist otherwise than potentially.
1
Since a definition is a formula, and every formula has parts; and since the formula is related to the thing in the same way as the part of the formula to the part of the thing, the questionThe questions discussed in chs. 10-12 arise out of the consideration of essence as definition. now arises: Must the formula of the parts be contained in the formula of the whole, or not? It seems clear that it is so in some cases, but not in others.
2
The formula of the circle does not include that of the segments, but the formula of the syllable includes that of the letters. And yet the circle is divisible into its segments in just the same way as the syllable into its letters.
2
Again, if the parts are prior to the whole, and the acute angle is part of the right angle, and the finger part of the animal, the acute angle will be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the man.
3
But it is considered that the latter are prior; for in the formula the parts are explained from them; and the wholes are prior also in virtue of their ability to exist independently. The truth probably is that part has several meanings, one of which is that which measures in respect of quantity. However, let us dismiss this question and consider of what, in the sense of parts, substance consists.
