Kitap 7
12
It is the same with the circle and the semicircle; for the semicircle is defined by means of the circle. And the finger is defined by means of the whole body; for a finger is a particular kind of part of a man. Thus such parts as are material, and into which the whole is resolved as into matter, are posterior to the whole; but such as are parts in the sense of parts of the formula and of the essence as expressed in the formula, are prior; either all or some of them.
13
And since the soul of animals (which is the substance of the living creature) is their substance in accordance with the formula, and the form and essence of that particular kind of body (at least each part, if it is to be properly defined, will not be defined apart from its function; and this will not belong to it apart from perceptionWhich implies soul.); therefore the parts of the soul are prior, either all or some of them, to the concrete animal; and similarly in other individual cases.
14
But the body and its parts are posterior to this substance, and it is not the substance, but the concrete whole, which is resolved into these parts as into matter. Therefore in one sense these parts are prior to the concrete whole, and in another not; for they cannot exist in separation. A finger cannot in every state be a part of a living animal; for the dead finger has only the name in common with the living one.
15
Some parts are contemporary with the whole: such as are indispensable and in which the formula and the essence are primarily present; e.g. the heart or perhaps the brain,Cf. Aristot. Met. 5.1.1. for it does not matter which of them is of this nature. But man and horse and terms which are applied in this way to individuals, but universally, are not substance, but a kind of concrete whole composed of this particular formula and this particular matter regarded as universal. But individually Socrates is already composed of ultimate matter; and similarly in all other cases.
