Kitap 7
16
A part, then, may be part of the form (by form I mean essence), or of the concrete whole composed of form and matter, or of the matter itself. But only the parts of the form are parts of the formula, and the formula refers to the universal; for circle is the same as essence of circle, and soul the same as essence of soul.
17
But when we come to the concrete thing, e.g. this circle—which is a particular individual, either sensible or intelligible (by intelligible circles I mean those of mathematics,i.e., something very similar to the Platonic intermediates. Cf. Introduction. and by sensible those which are of bronze or wood)—of these individuals there is no definition;
18
we apprehend them by intelligence or perception; and when they have passed from the sphere of actuality it is uncertain whether they exist or not, but they are always spoken of and apprehended by the universal formula. But the matter is in itself unknowable. Some matter is sensible and some intelligible; sensible, such as bronze and wood and all movable matter; intelligible, that which is present in sensible things not qua sensible, e.g. the objects of mathematics.See Aristot. Met. 13.2, 3.
19
We have now discussed the case of the whole and part, and of prior and posterior. But we must answer the question, when we are asked which is prior—the right angle and circle and animal, or that into which they are resolved and of which they are composed, i.e. their parts—by saying that neither is absolutely prior.
20
For if the soul also is the animal or living thing, or the soul of the individual is the individual, and being a circle is the circle, and being a right angle or the essence of the right angle is the right angle, then we must admit that the whole in one sense is posterior to the part in one sense: e.g. to the parts in the formula and the parts of a particular right angle
