Kitap 7
5
Nor, indeed, can any Idea be defined; for the Idea is an individual, as they say, and separable; and the formula must consist of words, and the man who is defining must not coin a word, because it would not be comprehensible. But the words which are in use are common to all the things which they denote; and so they must necessarily apply to something else as well. E.g., if a man were to define you, he would say that you are an animal which is lean or white or has some other attribute, which will apply to something else as well.
6
And if it should be said that there is no reason why all the attributes separately should not belong to several things, and yet in combination belong to this alone, we must reply, (1.) that they also belong to both the elements; e.g., two-footed animal belongs both to animal and to two-footed (and in the case of eternal elements this is even necessarily so; since they are prior to the compound, and parts of it.
7
Indeed they are also separable, if the term man is separable—for either neither can be separable, or both are so. If neither, the genus will not exist apart from the species, or if it is so to exist, so will the differentia); (2.) that animal and two-footed are prior in being to two-footed animal, and that which is prior to something else is not destroyed together with it.
8
Again, if the Ideas are composed of Ideas (for constituents are less composite than that which they compose), still the elements of which the Idea is composed (e.g. animal and two-footed) will have to be predicated of many particulars. Otherwise, how can they be known? For there would be an Idea which cannot be predicated of more than one thing. But this is not considered possible; every Idea is thought to admit of participation.
