Kitap 7
9
Thus, as we have said,The statement has only been implied in the preceding arguments. the impossibility of defining individuals is hard to realize when we are dealing with eternal entities, especially in the case of such as are unique, e.g. the sun and moon. For people go wrong not only by including in the definition attributes on whose removal it will still be sun—e.g., that which goes round the earth, or night-hidden (for they suppose that if it stops or becomes visiblesc. in the night. it will no longer be sun; but it is absurd that this should be so, since the sun denotes a definite substance)—they also mention attributes which may apply to something else; e.g., if another thing with those attributes comes into being, clearly it will be a sun. The formula, then, is general; but the sun was supposed to be an individual, like Cleon or Socrates.
10
Why does not one of the exponents of the Ideas produce a definition of them? If they were to try, it would become obvious that what we have just said is true.
1
It is obvious that even of those things which are thought to be substances the majority are potentialities; both the parts of living things (for none of them has a separate substantial existence; and when they are separated, although they still exist, they exist as matter), and earth, fire and air; for none of these is one thing —they are a mere aggregate before they are digested and some one thing is generated from them.
