Kitap 7
3
and because it is itself is the one explanation and reason which applies to all questions such as why is man man? or why is the cultured person cultured? (unless one were to say that each thing is indivisible from itself, and that this is what being one really means); but this, besides being a general answer, is a summary one.The argument is: The question Why is the cultured man a cultured man? if it does not mean Why is the man cultured? can only mean Why is a thing itself? But when we ask a question the fact must be obvious; and since it is obvious that a thing is itself, because it is itself (or because each thing is indivisible from itself) is the one and only complete answer to all questions of this type. Since this answer (in either form) is clearly unsatisfactory, the question which it answers cannot be a proper question. We may, however, ask why a man is an animal of such-and-such a kind.
4
It is clear, then, that we are not asking why he who is a man is a man; therefore we are asking why A, which is predicated of B, belongs to B. (The fact that A does belong to B must be evident, for if this is not so, the question is pointless.) E.g., Why does it thunder? means why is a noise produced in the clouds? for the true form of the question is one thing predicated in this way of another.
5
Or again, why are these things, e.g. bricks and stones, a house? Clearly then we are inquiring for the cause (i.e., to speak abstractly, the essence); which is in the case of some things, e.g. house or bed, the end , and in others the prime mover—for this also is a cause. We look for the latter kind of cause in the case of generation and destruction, but for the former also in the case of existence.
