Kitap 7
6
What we are now looking for is most obscure when one term is not predicated of another; e.g. when we inquire what man is; because the expression is a simple one not analyzed into subject and attributes. We must make the question articulate before we ask it; otherwise we get something which shares the nature of a pointless and of a definite question.
7
Now since we must know that the fact actually exists, it is surely clear that the question is why is the matter so-and-so? e.g. why are these materials a house? Because the essence of house is present in them. And this matter, or the body containing this particular form, is man. Thus what we are seeking is the cause (i.e. the form) in virtue of which the matter is a definite thing; and this is the substance of the thing.
7
Clearly then in the case of simple entitiesPure forms which contain no matter; in their case the method just described obviously will not apply. They can only be apprehended intuitively (cf. Aristot. Met. 9.10.). inquiry and explanation are impossible; in such cases there is a different mode of inquiry.
8
Now since that which is composed of something in such a way that the whole is a unity; not as an aggregate is a unity, but as a syllable isThis sentence is not finished; the parenthesis which follows lasts until the end of the chapter.—the syllable is not the letters, nor is BA the same as B and A; nor is flesh fire and earth; because after dissolution the compounds, e.g. flesh or the syllable, no longer exist; but the letters exist, and so do fire and earth.
9
Therefore the syllable is some particular thing; not merely the letters, vowel and consonant, but something else besides. And flesh is not merely fire and earth, or hot and cold, but something else besides.
