Kitap 8
4
But if, as we maintain, man is part matter and part form—the matter being potentially, and the form actually man—, the point which we are investigating will no longer seem to be a difficulty. For this difficulty is just the same as we should have if the definition of XLiterally cloak; cf. Aristot. Met. 7.4.7 n. were round bronze; for this name would give a clue to the formula, so that the question becomes what is the cause of the unification of round and bronze?
5
The difficulty is no longer apparent, because the one is matter and the other form. What then is it (apart from the active cause) which causes that which exists potentially to exist actually in things which admit of generation? There is no other cause of the potential sphere’s being an actual sphere; this was the essence of each.i.e., it was the essence of the potential sphere to become the actual sphere, and of the actual sphere to be generated from the potential sphere.
6
Some matter is intelligible and some sensible, and part of the formula is always matter and part actuality; e.g., the circle is a plane figure.Even formulae contain matter in a sense (intelligible matter); i.e. the generic element in the species. Plane figure is the generic element of circle. But such thingThe highest genera, or categories. as have no matter, neither intelligible nor sensible, are ipso facto each one of them essentially something one; just as they are essentially something existent: an individual substance, a quality, or a quantity. Hence neither existent nor one is present in their definitions. And their essence is ipso facto something one, just as it is something existent.
7
Hence also there is no other cause of the unity of any of these things, or of their existence; for each one of them is one and existent not because it is contained in the genus being or unity, nor because these genera exist separately apart from their particulars, but ipso facto.
