Kitap 1
9.19
all acts done for the sake of others, for they are more disinterested; the successes gained, not for oneself but for others; and for one's benefactors, for that is justice; in a word, all acts of kinds, for they are disinterested.
9.20
And the contrary of those things of which we are ashamed; for we are ashamed of what is disgraceful, in words, acts, or intention; as, for instance, when Alcaeus said: I would fain say something, but shame holds me back,Frag. 55 (P.L.G. 3.). Sappho rejoined: Hadst thou desired what was good or noble, and had not thy tongue stirred up some evil to utter it, shame would not have filled thine eyes; but thou would'st have spoken of what is right.Frag. 28 (P.L.G. 3.).
9.21
Those things also are noble for which men anxiously strive, but without fear; for men are thus affected about goods which lead to good repute.
9.22
Virtues and actions are nobler, when they proceed from those who are naturally worthier, for instance, from a man rather than from a woman.
9.23
It is the same with those which are the cause of enjoyment to others rather than to ourselves; this is why justice and that which is just are noble.
9.24
To take vengeance on one's enemies is nobler than to come to terms with them; for to retaliate is just, and that which is just is noble; and further, a courageous man ought not to allow himself to be beaten.
9.25
Victory and honor also are noble; for both are desirable even when they are fruitless, and are manifestations of superior virtue. And things worthy of remembrance, which are the more honorable the longer their memory lasts; those which follow us after death; those which are accompanied by honor; and those which are out of the common. Those which are only possessed by a single individual, because they are more worthy of remembrance.
