Kitap 1
15.32
Now, since we have shown how we must deal with each case individually, it is clear how we must deal with them when taken two and two; for instance, if we wish to take the oath but not to tender it, to tender it but not to take it, to accept and tender it, or to do neither the one nor the other. For such cases, and similarly the arguments, must be a combination of those already mentioned. And if we have already taken an oath which contradicts the present one, we may argue that it is not perjury; for whereas wrongdoing is voluntary, and perjury is wrongdoing, what is done in error or under compulsion is involuntary.
15.33
Here we must draw the conclusion that perjury consists in the intention, not in what is said.The defence in such cases is: (1) that the previous oath was taken as a result of fraud or compulsion; (2) that you did not mean what you said. But if the opponent has taken such an oath, we may say that one who does not abide by what be has sworn subverts everything, for this is the reason why the dicasts take an oath before applying the laws; and [we may make this appeal]: They demand that you abide by your oath as judges, while they themselves do not abide by theirs. Further, we should employ all means of amplification. Let this suffice for the inartificial proofs.
