Kitap 2
25.11
This may take place in two ways, from consideration either of the time or of the facts.χρόνῳ . . . πράγμασιν. If χρόνῳ be taken to mean the date, there are the following alternatives. The date may be questioned, the facts admitted; both date and facts may be questioned; both date and facts may be admitted, but circumstances may have altered (a pound was worth twenty shillings in 1914, not in 1924). Others take χρόνῳ to mean the greater number of times the same fact has occurred, πράγμασι the more numerous facts that increase probability. But χρόνῳ can hardly bear this meaning (see Jebb's note). The strongest objections are those in which both are combined; for a thing is more probable, the greater the number of similar cases.
25.12
Signs and enthymemes based upon signs, even if true, may be refuted in the manner previously stated1.2.18; or, at the beginning, i.e., of this book.; for it is clear from the AnalyticsAristot. Pr. Anal. 2.27. that no sign can furnish a logical conclusion.
25.13
As for enthymemes derived from examples, they may be refuted in the same manner as probabilities. For if we have a single fact that contradicts the opponent's example, the argument is refuted as not being necessary, even though examples, more in number and of more common occurrence, are otherwiseOn the other side, in the opponent's favor.; but if the majority and greater frequency of examples is on the side of the opponent, we must contend either that the present example is not similar to those cited by him, or that the thing did not take place in the same way, or that there is some difference.
