Kitap 2
25.10
Wherefore, by the employment of this fallacy, the defendant always has an advantage over the accuser. For since the latter always bases his proof upon probabilities, and it is not the same thing to show that an argument is not probable as to show that it is not necessary, and that which is only true for the most part is always liable to objection (otherwise it would not be probable, but constant and necessary),—then the judge thinks, if the refutation is made in this manner,That is, if the argument is shown to be not necessary. either that the argument is not probable, or that it is not for him to decide,The important point in the conclusion drawn is that the judge thinks it is not his business to decide, because the argument is not necessary, whereas his duty is to decide, not about things that are necessary but about things that are probable. being deceived by the fallacy, as we have just indicated. For his judgement must not rest upon necessary arguments alone, but also upon probabilities; for this is what is meant by deciding according to the best of one's judgement. It is therefore not enough to refute an argument by showing that it is not necessary; it must also be shown that it is not probable. This will be attained if the objection itself is specially based upon what happens generally.
